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Computational reputation-based trust models using statistical learning have been intensively studied for
distributed systems where peers behave maliciously. However practical applications of such models in envi-
ronments with both malicious and rational behaviors are still very little understood. In this article, we study
the relation between their accuracy measures and their ability to enforce cooperation among participants
and discourage selfish behaviors. We provide theoretical results that show the conditions under which co-
operation emerges when using computational trust models with a given accuracy, and how cooperation can
still be sustained while reducing the cost and accuracy of those models.
Specifically, we propose a peer selection protocol that uses a computational trust model as a dishonesty
detector to filter out unfair ratings. We prove that such a model with reasonable misclassification error
bound in identifying malicious ratings can effectively build trust and cooperation in the system, considering
rationality of participants. These results reveal two interesting observations. First, the key to the success
of a reputation system in a rational environment is not a sophisticated trust-learning mechanism, but an
effective identity-management scheme to prevent whitewashing behaviors. Second, given an appropriate
identity-management mechanism, a reputation-based trust model with a moderate accuracy bound can be
used to effectively enforce cooperation in systems with both rational and malicious participants. As a result,
in heterogeneous environments where peers use different algorithms to detect misbehavior of potential
partners, cooperation may still emerge. We verify and extend these theoretical results to a variety of settings
involving honest, malicious, and strategic players through extensive simulation. These results will enable
a much more targeted, cost-effective and realistic design for decentralized trust management systems, such
as needed for peer-to-peer, electronic commerce, or community systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Reputation information has long been shown as an effective tool to enforce coopera-
tion and build trust among participants in a variety of e-commerce systems and online
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forums such as eBay.com, Yahoo Auction (auctions.yahoo.com), or recommender sys-
tems (amazon.com). Due to the open nature of such applications, participants usually
do not have incentives to cooperate, e.g., not to ship the items after receiving payments
in an auction site, or not to contribute any resource. In those cases reputation based
on user feedback can be an effective measure to isolate bad participants and promote
good behaviors.
Existing reputation system designs can be generally classified into two classes, the
first being the computational trust models that predict peers’ behavior, e.g., whether
a peer offers high quality services and gives reliable recommendations on the others,
based on their historical performance. Such methods [Despotovic 2005; Anceaume and
Ravoaja 2006; Sun et al. 2006] are designed to be resilient against different types of at-
tacks from malicious users—those wanting to take the system down at any cost. Peers
are assumed to behave probabilistically: those that have cooperated in the past are
supposed to do similarly in forthcoming transactions. Computational trust models usu-
ally ignore the fact that many participants have economic incentives and behave ratio-
nally. The second solution category comprises the mechanism design approaches that
use reputation as a sanctioning tool to enforce cooperation and establish trust among
rational participants by penalizing bad peers and rewarding good ones [Dellarocas
2005a; Jurca and Faltings 2006; Miller et al. 2005]. Rational peers are opportunistic
and adapt their behaviors strategically to maximize their expected lifetime utilities.
The system is designed as a game whose structure ensures that being cooperative is
the strategy in equilibriums of rational peers. Solutions in this class usually rely on
many assumptions, such as peers being fully rational and having unlimited computa-
tional power to find the complex equilibriums of the mechanisms. More importantly,
they do not consider the malicious behavior of attackers.
Since both rationally opportunistic and malicious behaviors can be present in real
environments, an effective reputation management approach to minimize the influ-
ence of these unwanted behaviors is of paramount importance. A natural question is
how we can exploit well-tested and accurate computational trust models to effectively
establish trust among partners in environments where peers may exhibit various be-
haviors, including honest, malicious, and rationally opportunistic. More concretely,
it is important to know under which conditions computational trust models that are
resilient against malicious attackers can also motivate cooperation of rationally oppor-
tunistic players.
Another issue we want to address is to minimize the cost of using expensive com-
putational trust models in environments where most peers are rational. A solution
to this question implies many benefits for various applications, e.g., where peers have
limited resources and quick decisions are generally preferred to avoid missing oppor-
tunities, especially in competitive scenarios. In fact, given the rationality of peers,
it may be unnecessary to always use accurate yet costly learning algorithms to en-
courage truthful behaviors. The reason is that rationally selfish peers make use of
their knowledge about the deployed algorithm(s) to avoid having bad reputations and
maintain their high benefits from the system. Being aware of the existence of such
learning algorithms that can reliably detect bad behaviors, peers have little incentives
to cheat and thus expensive learning can be avoided. Consequently, accurate yet costly
trust-learning mechanisms may be needed as an inspection tool to detect past cheating
behaviors, in order to punish bad agents appropriately, e.g., by not selecting them for
later transactions. Such punishment meted out to peers found cheating can be used to
provide sufficient incentives for their cooperation.
This article proposes and analyzes a simple but effective way of using a compu-
tational trust model to minimize the influence of malicious peers and at the same
time, keep rational peers cooperative during most of their transactions. Specifically,
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we propose a peer selection protocol that consists of two steps. First, a computational
trust model is used to estimate the reliability of the most recent rating on a peer.
The result of this evaluation is then used to decide whether to include the target
peer for selection or to ignore/blacklist the peer being rated. Thanks to its simplicity,
the protocol can be easily applied in various open systems with different degrees of
centralization. As a result, this work provides the following contributions.
— We prove that if the accuracy of the chosen computational trust model is sufficiently
good, rational peers find it most beneficial to cooperate in all but some last trans-
actions. According to extensive simulation, this result still holds if peers join and
leave dynamically, provided that most of them stay long enough. The key to en-
forcing cooperation in such environments is an identity management scheme to ef-
fectively prevent whitewashing behavior, rather than the trust learning algorithm
being used.
— We propose a cost-efficient trust management approach that ensures cooperation
and trust in the system, while minimizing the related cost. Inspired by an inspec-
tion game-theoretic approach [Avenhaus et al. 2002], we prove that under certain
assumptions, the evaluation of rating reliability can be done by using an accurate,
yet expensive, computational trust model with a low frequency while still maintain-
ing high cooperation in the system. As a result, the total implementation cost of the
whole selection protocol can be significantly reduced.
As a theoretical contribution, this work bridges the gap between Friedman and
Resnick [2001] and the existing works studying properties of various computational
trust models. We show that besides the necessity of effective identity-management to
avoid whitewashing behavior, in rational environments a small error bound in iden-
tifying malicious ratings by a computational trust model is sufficient to enforce co-
operation. Therefore, any existing trust learning algorithm in the literature with a
moderate error bound can be used to build cooperation among rational participants.
Cooperation is generally possible in heterogeneous environments, where peers use dif-
ferent algorithms to learn the trustworthiness of their potential partners, as long as
these algorithms guarantee a reasonable error bound.
Our system model will be presented in the next section. In Section 3 we analyze
in detail the relation between the accuracy of a computational trust model and its
ability to enforce cooperation of the rational participants. We then propose combining
different trust models to minimize their usage cost while retaining the possibility of
fostering cooperation among peers, in Section 4. Section 5 proposes an approximate ap-
proach to use computational trust models in dynamic scenarios with peers joining and
leaving over time. Our simulation and experimental results are presented in Section 6.
We summarize related work in Section 7 before concluding the article in Section 8.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
2.1. Example Applications
Throughout the article, the following example is used to illustrate the fundamental
concepts and results of our work. We consider a decentralized (peer-to-peer) market
of products or services, where each participant can be provider and/or client of cer-
tain services. As a concrete example, any person in the Internet can advertise and
sell their goods or services in a peer-to-peer system or on an online social network
like Facebook.com. Another realistic showcase of this is the recent launch of Neigh-
borhoods (neighborhoods.ebay.com) that enables eBay users to do shopping via their
social networks. Henceforth, we use the following notions of a client, a provider,
or a service to illustrate our concepts in this example market of services. In other
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application contexts these notions may refer, respectively, to a buyer, a seller, or a
resource or an article to be sold in the system.
In this scenario, clients can search to buy the services that match their needs and
interests. As a common rule, a client has to pay for the service first. Only after receiv-
ing the payment, the provider may provide the service with either low or high quality.
E.g., in eBay a low quality service means either the seller cheats by not shipping an
article, or the article is not of good quality as described. The traditional way to enforce
the cooperation of a provider via a reputation mechanism is to allow a client to rate
the service of the provider as good or bad after finishing the transaction [Resnick et al.
2000]. Other clients use the available ratings on a provider to decide whether they
should do business with that provider. In this case, a computational trust mechanism
is very helpful to effectively eliminate unreliable ratings and minimize the influence
of malicious raters.
This article focuses on the cooperation among participants in the application layer:
we assume the existence of a possibly decentralized storage system that supports
efficient storage and search for publicly available information—namely the descrip-
tion of available services and their ratings. Such a storage system must ensure that
advertisements of provided services, published ratings, and transaction information
are authentic and cannot be tampered with. In other words, peers can neither fake
transactions nor modify the feedback submitted by others. Although addressing these
security goals are beyond the scope of our article, we believe existing solutions are
available. For example, these goals can be met by using a DHT-based storage [Aberer
et al. 2003] and cryptographic tools such as digital signatures based on a decentral-
ized PKI infrastructure [Datta et al. 2003]. Also, centralized storage solutions, e.g.,
provided by eBay, can be considered sufficiently secure.
Peers are assumed to stay in the system long enough so that reputation information
is effective. This assumption can be relaxed under certain circumstances, e.g., in cen-
tralized environments where it is possible to impose an entrance fee for a newly joined
peer. In practice, this assumption also holds since identities are not cheap: users must
invest time and money to build relationships before they can participate in business
transactions with others. Therefore, it is better for most users to stay longer in the
system rather than departing and starting everything all over with a new identity.
The cheap identity issue is discussed in another work of ours [Vu and Aberer 2010].
These simplifying assumptions are standard and well-accepted in the trust and rep-
utation research communities[Despotovic 2005]. More importantly, the system model
is realistic—it is an abstraction of several practical P2P application scenarios with dif-
ferent degrees of centralization, where participants are rational to a certain extent.
Such a scenario can represent, for example, a centralized eBay-like trading site, a so-
cial network-based system for selling and buying goods, or decentralized markets of
computational or storage services [Buyya et al. 2001; Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos
2003]. Consequently, the proposed solution can be used in all of these applications.
2.2. System Model
Denote P the set of participants (peers) in the example P2P market of services.
Let the mapping W : P × P → D f be the observable online social relationship
among them, where Df is the domain of relationship values. For example, Df may
represent the closeness between two friends in an online social network (family/
close/normal/stranger) or the weight of an edge in a trust network1 of the participants.
1trust.mindswap.org
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Denote as O = {0, 1}, the set of outcomes, corresponding to bad or good, of a transac-
tion between peers. A peer provides a service with price u for its clients, where u lies
within a range of minimal price u∗ and maximal price u∗. In practice, a centralized
system can define these values u∗ for each category of services or products, or peers
can learn these values by looking at the trading history of other peers in the system.
Thus we name u the legitimate payoff (or gain) of a provider peer in a transaction if
it behaves honestly, e.g., providing a service with high quality. The transaction in this
case is considered as having a good outcome to the client. Note that if there is a small
probability that a provider with honest behavior still yields a bad transaction outcome
to the client, the inclusion of such a probability in our approach is straightforward. In
the opposite case if the provider cheats (provides a bad service), the provider gains a
further illegitimate amount v, where 0 ≤ v ≤ v∗ < ∞ and the transaction outcome is
considered as bad. The upper bound v∗ typically depends on the maximal price u∗ of
a service, and is only necessary in our theoretical analysis. In practice, rational peers
need to know only v for each transaction they one involved in. For example, v approxi-
mates the service value as evaluated by the provider plus the shipping cost. Note that
v may be less than the service value u, e.g., the client still receives the service, which
has worse quality than that of the original description.
We also define  as the set of all transactions in the system and (x, y) the set of
all transactions where peer x is the client and peer y is the provider. For convenience,
let S(x) be the set of peers having provided services to x. Let r(x, y, tr) ∈ O = {0, 1} be a
binary rating from a peer x on another peer y on a transaction tr ∈ (x, y).
2.3. Computational Trust Models as Dishonesty Detectors
A peer (the learning peer) may use a computational trust model to learn the rating
behavior of another (the target). A trust model can be implemented with various sta-
tistical or heuristic methods and based on several information sources. These sources
may include personal experience of the learning peer, the recommendations/ratings
on the target and the target’s intrinsic features, namely the frequencies of its ratings
[Cornelli et al. 2002] or the benefit relationships of the rater and the rated peer [Ashri
et al. 2005]. We propose using such a computational trust model as a dishonesty de-
tector to evaluate the trustworthiness (reliability) of a rating on a provider. From this
perspective, a trust mechanism can be abstracted as in Definition 2.1 (see Section 2.2
for the related notations).
Definition 2.1. A personalized reputation-based computational trust model used by
a peer i to estimate the trustworthiness of a rating by another peer j is a 5-tuple
R = 〈Pi, Vi,F j, A , D〉 where:
— Pi ⊆ P is a set of peers that i considered as relevant to the evaluation;
— Vi ⊆ {r(x, y, tr) | x, y ∈ Pi, tr ∈ (x, y)} is the set of ratings related to peers in Pi;
—F j is the properties of the target peer j, for instance, its location, its frequencies of
posted ratings, the number of involved transactions, etc. and so on;
— A is an algorithm that operates on Pi, W, Vi,F j and outputs a trust value Tij, where
W is the social relationships among peers. Tij may take a binary, discrete, or real
value, and is the estimated trustworthiness of j in posting the current rating; and
— D is the decision rule(s) with a binary outcome in {1, 0}, stating whether i should
trust the rating by j given the personalized trustworthiness Tij.
Definition 2.1 is an abstraction of several (if not most) popular heuristic or statis-
tical trust evaluation algorithms in the literature, including those trust management
approaches in peer-to-peer systems [Despotovic and Aberer 2006], social networks
[Golbeck 2006], and other online communities [Dellarocas 2005b; Jøsang et al. 2007].
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The appendix gives some examples using the formalism in Definition 2.1 to model
some computational trust models proposed in Xiong and Liu [2004] and Vu and Aberer
[2007]. Other trust models can be represented similarly. For instance, the global
trust models like EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] and complaint-based [Aberer and
Despotovic 2001] consider all peers in the networks as relevant to the computation,
thus Pi = P, and consider the recommendation/ratings among each pair of them.
Another simple yet important model is given in Example 2.2.
Example 2.2. The naive computational trust model N = 〈∅,∅,∅,I, DI 〉 uses an al-
gorithm, A = I, which always outputs Tij = 1 and the set of decision rules, DI , which
always considers a rating reliable. That is, the naive modelN simply trusts all ratings
by any peer.
Considering a computational trust model as a dishonesty detector, we define its
statistical accuracy measures as similar to those of a conventional spam filter [Graham
2002] in Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3. The accuracy of a dishonesty detector R in estimating the reliability
of a rating is defined by its two misclassification error rates, the false positive rate
α =Pr(a rating estimated as reliable by R | the rating is actually unreliable), and the
false negative rate β = Pr(a rating estimated as unreliable by R | the rating is actually
reliable).
The accuracy of a computational trust model implies its resilience to the possible
malicious manipulation of the ratings. Although the actual values α, β, of a dishon-
esty detector may be unknown and change (possibly improve) over time, given the
learning capability of the computational mechanism, we are mostly interested in the
upper-bound ε of these errors. The values α, β, ε, whichever are known, are common
knowledge in the system.
2.4. Strategic Peer Selection Protocol
The following protocol is proposed for a rational peer, as a client, to select a provider
among candidates (Definition 2.4). The concrete implementation of this selection pro-
tocol in a dynamic setting will be presented in Section 5.
Definition 2.4. A peer (a potential client) uses the following peer selection protocol
Sk = 〈R, k〉 (where k ≥ 1) to evaluate the eligibility of a provider for its transactions.
(1) The client gets the most recent binary rating r on the provider, considering the
absence of a rating as the presence of a positive one.
(2) The binary reliability t̂ of r is evaluated with the computational trust model R.
(3) If t̂ = 1 ∧ r = 0 or t̂ = 0 ∧ r = 1, the client publishes this information (a reliable
detection of one cheating by the provider) to the shared space (a global black list).
(4) The provider is included for selection if in the shared space there are less than k
published cheating detections on the provider, otherwise the provider is ignored.
Table I summarizes the most frequently used notations in the article. The para-
meter k ≥ 1 represents the cautiousness of a peer in trusting the cheating detections
published by the others. The evaluation of rating reliability with a computational trust
model in step (2) is used to reduce influences of strategic manipulation of ratings by
rational or malicious peers. The goal here is to eliminate as many malicious providers
as possible when they cheat and motivate rationally opportunistic providers to coop-
erate. The use of this peer selection protocol with a global computational trust model
mimics the behavior of a centralized reputation system in practice. The protocol Sk is
tough for bad providers, including malicious and rationally opportunistic ones. Given
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Table I. Commonly Used Notations
Notation Definition
u∗, u∗ minimal and maximal price of the offered services, respectively
u legitimate gain of a provider when cooperating, u∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗
v additional gain by cheating of a provider in a transaction, v > 0
v∗ maximal additional cheating gain of a provider, 0 ≤ v∗ < ∞
R a computational trust model to estimate a rating’s reliability (Definition 2.1)
N the naı¨ve trust model in Example 2.2
α Pr(rating estimated as reliable | rating is actually unreliable)
β Pr(rating estimated as unreliable | rating is actually reliable)
ε upper-bound of α and β, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1
k # of posted cheating detections on a provider
before it is globally ignored by other clients
Sk = 〈R, k〉 a peer selection protocol specified in Definition 2.4
 # of remaining transactions in which a rational provider
does not necessarily have incentives to cooperate,  > 0
the high cost of identities, as previously assumed, it assures that a globally blacklisted
provider has no further chance to provide services or gain revenues from the system.
An extension of this analysis to the case of cheap identities is given in another work of
ours [Vu and Aberer 2010].
We want to emphasize that this work is only specific in its assumption of the selec-
tion protocol. Though better protocols are feasible, the current one allows us to study
the dependencies of the accuracy of learning and cooperation in the system, in a gen-
eral way. The results obtained are generally applicable in case of any computational
trust mechanism being used and in the presence of many realistic user behaviors; in
fact, many existing reputation-based trust approaches are covered by this selection
protocol.
2.5. Scope of Analysis
To make the problem tractable, we do not consider the following orthogonal issues.
First, the incentives of peers to leave feedback after a transaction, are not dealt with
directly in this work. Nevertheless, the absence of a rating after a transaction is seen
as the presence of a positive rating, thus in the case of few ratings, appropriate deci-
sions can still be made. Similarly, providing incentives to share data for the evaluation
of a rating’s reliability is an orthogonal issue. These incentives for sharing the learning
results can be solved—a client can still do the learning by itself and our approach still
holds if the evaluation of rating reliability is verifiable so that wrong evaluations can
be detected. In centralized systems, any evaluation is performed by a single trusted
entity and thus no verification is necessary. In decentralized systems, the learning in
step (2) can be implemented to be verifiable by any peer by requiring the peers to also
post data related to their evaluation, to the shared public space, or to provide such
data on-demand for the querying peer(s), e.g., via an easy-to-validate form such as
proof-carrying-code [Necula 1997]. Furthermore, it is possible to integrate existing in-
centive mechanisms, e.g., via side-payment [Miller et al. 2005] to motivate the sharing
of feedback and evaluation results in the system.
Another potential problem is when many peers collude to badmouth a provider.
Accidental blacklisting of a good peer is not very harmful to a client and can be reduced
by increasing k and lowering the error of the rating evaluation with a more expensive
and sophisticated trust model. A robust computational trust model R should consider
the trustworthiness of both the rater and the rated provider to reduce the undesired
impact of observation noise and badmouthing. The designing of such a robust and
accurate computational trust mechanism, however, is orthogonal to the current work.
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3. USING COMPUTATIONAL TRUST MODELS TO FOSTER COOPERATION
3.1. Quantifying a Computational Trust Model’s Accuracy
The misclassification errors of a given computational model depend on several factors,
the most important being the design of the model.
Proposition 3.1 presents a preliminary analysis on the accuracy measures of a com-
putational trust model used by a rational peer and can be seen as one guideline to im-
plement an appropriate dishonesty detector in our approach. The proof can be found
in the electronic appendix accessible in the ACM Digital Library.
PROPOSITION 3.1. Given a computational trust model R = 〈Pi, Vi,F j, A , D〉 (c.f.
Def. 2.1) publicly known to every peer. Suppose that raters are rational and want to
maximize the misclassification errors of the detection. If D yields a deterministic and
publicly known outcome at each evaluation step, in equilibrium α = β = 0.5. The use of
the modelR as a dishonesty detector thus yields no better result than random guessing.
We are concerned with those computational models that have the upper-bound of
misclassification errors ε < 0.5. Although Proposition 3.1 shows cases where such
bounds cannot be achieved, practically accurate learning with α, β upper-bounded by
some ε < 0.5 is feasible. We claim that the details of algorithm A, e.g., the rating
history to be used for the estimation, or the decision rule D can be kept as private in-
formation of the learning peer before the evaluation (after which the related data can
be published to enable verification). Misclassification errors of the associated computa-
tional trust model as a dishonesty detector can be measured by empirical experiments.
This question has already been extensively studied in previous work, namely Xiong
and Liu [2004] and Kamvar et al. [2003], most of which have shown that low α, β can
be achieved under various rating manipulation attacks. In Section 6.4 we will also
present measurements on the errors α, β of popular computational trust models and
confirm that achieving an accuracy bound ε < 0.5 is possible. The naive computational
trust model N , which trusts any rating and considers the absence of a rating as a pos-
itive one, has the misclassification errors α = α0 = 1 and β = β0 = 0 (see Example A.3
in the appendix).
Another example of an accurate yet expensive method to estimate the reliability of
ratings is to perform full monitoring on performance of the provider to learn its real
past behavior. Such a monitoring can be implemented in many ways. In an e-commerce
system, it is possibly done via legal investigations of suspicious transactions. In a
market of e-services, one can deploy monitoring agents to periodically probe and test
the service being offered by a provider to estimate the real offered quality level offered
by that provider during a specific period.
3.2. Using Trust Models for Cooperation Enforcement
Given a bound ε for α, β of the computational trust model(s) being used by clients in
the system, Theorem 3.2 shows the relation between the error bound ε of a computa-
tional trust model and its effectiveness in enforcing cooperation of a provider during
its lifetime. Again the proof can be found in the electronic appendix.
THEOREM 3.2. Given the peer selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉, where the computa-
tional trust model R has the misclassification errors α, β upper-bounded by ε < 0.5.
Suppose that identities are difficult or very costly to obtain for any participant. If we
have in addition ε < εmax(k) = 1/(1 + k
√
1 + v∗/u∗), then with v defined as:
v = max{1, 
ln [1 − vεku∗((1−ε)k−εk) ]
ln (1 − εk) }, (1)
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Fig. 1. The relation between ε and  for different values of k and u∗ = v∗. A rational provider finds it most
beneficial to cooperate during all but its last  transactions.
(1) it is optimal for a rational provider to cooperate in the current transaction, whose
additional cheating gain is v, if the provider stays for more than v further trans-
actions;
(2) a rational provider considers cooperation as its best response strategy in all but its
last  = v∗ transactions.2
(3) Let Nh be the number of transactions in which an honest provider can participate
till mistakenly blacklisted, and let Nc be the number of bad transactions a malicious
provider can defect until globally eliminated from the system, respectively, then
E[Nh] > 1/εk and E[Nc] < 1/(1 − ε)k.
These results hold even in the presence of strategic manipulation of ratings by
providers.
Theorem 3.2 also holds if the clients use different computational trust models with
different inputs and personalized settings to evaluate the trustworthiness of the last
rater, and the probability of detecting a bad rater is different for each peer. The analy-
sis can also be extended to include the probability that an honest provider appears as
cheating, e.g., a good seller rated negatively for an article lost during shipping, or the
probability a cheating provider still satisfies the client, e.g., a seller sends a low-quality
article yet still pleases the client.
Naturally,  → ∞ with very high values of the cheating gain v∗, such as when
expensive articles are sold. Enforcing the cooperation of a rational provider in such
expensive transactions is impossible, which is intuitive. In other cases, a relation
between  and the error upper-bound ε can be drawn, as in Figure 1 with v∗ = u∗, i.e.,
peers sell and buy items of comparable prices. We have the following observations.
First, the required upper-bound εmax(k) reaches 0.5 with larger k values, yet the
incentive of cooperation decreases rapidly ( becomes larger). Even so, for rational
long-term providers who stay in the system infinitely, the number of last transactions
 plays no role and thus any trust model with a reasonably good accuracy ε < εmax(k)
can be used as an effective sanctioning tool to motivate providers’ cooperation
(Corollary 3.3). Given an approximate value of ε, one should select the threshold k
appropriately such that ε < εmax(k). For a given ε < εmax(k), smaller threshold k is
2With small εk, v∗ = max{1, v∗/(u∗((1 − ε)k − εk))}, as in a previous work [Vu and Aberer 2008].
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Fig. 2. Relation between ε and a lower-bound of E[Nh] (left), and an upper-bound of E[Nc] (right).
preferred. In certain application contexts where the providers only participate in a
limited number of transactions, or in cases with high k values, very high levels of
accuracy (ε < 0.05) are required to reduce the parameter , i.e., to ensure cooperation
of providers in most transactions.
Note that we do not offer any conclusions on the incentives of cooperation of a ratio-
nal provider when selling its last  services. In fact the provider may find it beneficial
to even cooperate in these last transactions, if the temporary cheating gain is small
compared to the probability of being blacklisted. This was shown in our experiments
where fully cooperative providers who never cheat even in their last transactions have
higher utilities than the strategic providers who may defect when providing some of
their last  services.
COROLLARY 3.3. It is possible to use any computational trust model with misclassi-
fication errors upper-bounded by some ε < εmax < 0.5 to effectively enforce cooperation of
rational providers who participate infinitely or in a very large number of transactions,
even in the presence of strategic rating manipulation by participants.
The possibility of correctly eliminating the malicious providers and wrongly black-
listing the honest ones is given in Figure 2. The system behaves much better with
lower ε, as intuitively expected. The higher the accuracy of the computational trust
model being used (lower ε), the higher the expected number of transactions an honest
provider may stay in the system (higher E[Nh]), and the lower the survival chance
of the malicious providers (lower E[Nc]). Also, higher thresholds k, reduce the pos-
sibilities of wrongly blacklisting honest providers yet also increase the incentives of
malicious behaviors. Hence, given a known ε, it is recommended to choose the value
of k appropriately, depending on the prior information on the environment vulnerabil-
ity. In vulnerable environments, smaller k values are better used by clients to quickly
eliminate bad providers at the cost of ignoring good providers. In less vulnerable sys-
tems higher k is recommended. Note that the trend given in Figure 2 is for the worst
case scenario where an honest provider is repeatedly badmouthed by other users, and
a malicious provider has enough resources for disguising her cheating activities by
consecutively posting many positive ratings to the system.
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Our analysis holds if there exists an effective identity management scheme to en-
sure that blacklisted providers have to pay a high cost to enter the system again,
and hence identities are not cheap. This is realistic in many practical applications,
e.g., in our running example of trading on a social network such as Facebook, users
have to spend time and money to build strong relationships with other users, so it is
nonoptimal for them to simply cheat, discard their long-time investment in their cur-
rent identities and start all over again. Our analysis also provides a starting point
to design a mechanism to ensure full cooperation of rational providers, either by (1)
explicitly imposing a sufficiently high entrance cost c ≥ v∗ for newcomers, or (2)
by giving advantages to a provider with a longer interaction history, e.g., by match-
ing the provider to more clients and increasing the value of its identity to demotivate
it from cheating and escape. An extension regarding (2) is given in another work
[Vu and Aberer 2010].
3.3. Using the Naive Computational Trust Model to Foster Cooperation
Corollary 3.4 shows the relation between the capability of the naively optimistic trust
model N (Example 2.2) in enforcing cooperation and the client’s truthfully reporting
probability h, assuming no strategic rating manipulation. The selection protocol 〈N , 1〉
is actually equivalent to the reputation system with only the last rating studied by
Dellarocas [2005a].
COROLLARY 3.4. Suppose that 1 ≥ h > hmin = (1 + v∗/u∗)/(1 + 2v∗/u∗) is the average
probability that a client leaves an honest rating after a transaction. Without strategic
rating manipulation, the peer selection protocol 〈N , 1〉 makes it optimal for a rational
provider to cooperate in all transactions but its last  = max{1,  ln [1−(1−h)/(2h−1)]ln h } ones.
Such a selection mechanism also gives direct incentives for long-term rational clients to
leave truthful ratings after their transactions.
The assumption of no strategic rating manipulation in Corollary 3.4 implies that
users submit a rating based only their erroneous evaluation of a provider’s behavior. In
the presence of strategic manipulation of the reports, a client must use a sophisticated
trust-learning algorithm to evaluate the reliability of the rater, as presented in the
Section 3.2. Otherwise a selection protocol using only the latest rating can be easily
attacked. After cheating in a transaction a provider may collude with another client to
stuff a positive rating on a new fake transaction to hide its malicious behavior. Figure 3
shows the relation between the overall probability h a peer is an honest reporting
peer vs. the number of  last transactions for which rational providers do not find
incentives to cooperate, for different v∗ and u∗. The cases where v∗/u∗ < 1 correspond
to when a provider sells a service with a lower quality than it promises. Let us consider
the previous trading scenario where peers sell and buy services of similar prices (u∗ 
v∗). If the provider is a long-term player, and the honest rating probability h > hmin 
.8 (a highly noisy environment), then it is optimal for a provider to behave honestly for
most of its transactions, except the last two.
4. COST-EFFICIENT REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
While a computational trust model with a better accuracy is generally preferable (see
Theorem 3.2), it usually comes with higher cost. The implementation cost of a compu-
tational trust model 〈Pi, Vi,F j, A , D〉 (Def. 2.1) may consist of several components.
— The communication cost τc to explore the peers Pi and retrieve the relevant ratings
Vi. Associated with this cost is the storage cost τs to store and to maintain rating
information and historical performance of potential partners/raters.
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Fig. 3. The relation between the truthful reporting rate h and the number of last transactions during which
a rational provider has no incentive to cooperate in case its clients use the selection protocol 〈N , 1〉.
— The computational cost τe of the algorithm A and decision-making algorithm D to
aggregate, analyze ratings and make appropriate decisions.
— The monetary cost τm. Reliable ratings can be considered as sellable goods, thus buy-
ing them incurs certain costs. τm may also include the payment for the participants
to elicit their truthful reporting in some reputation mechanisms, such as Miller
et al. [2005].
— The hidden/opportunity cost τo . Time-consuming trust learning algorithms may
lead to late decisions and be more costly, especially in competitive scenarios.
A detailed study of the cost model of each computational model is system and
application-dependent. For example, the estimation of the significant opportunity cost
τo during the lifetime of a peer is nontrivial. Such a study of all cost types of existing
algorithms is out of the scope of this work. We only focus on the communication cost
τc, and the related cost measurements for typical computational trust models, which
are be given in Section 6.
Consider the case where a peer can select between a computational trust model R1
or another modelR2, to evaluate the most recent rating on a provider. Suppose thatR1
is an accurate algorithm with misclassification errors α, β upper-bounded by a small
ε < εmax(k = 1), and with an expected cost C1. An example R1 is to buy information
from some third-party monitoring agents to get an estimate of the provider’s behavior
on the last transaction. Let R2 be the naive computational trust model N that trusts
any rating, which has the misclassification errors α2 = 1, β2 = 0 and a negligible cost
C2  C1. Since α, β < ε < εmax(k = 1), the expensive model R1, can be used to motivate
the cooperation of the providers in most of their transactions (Theorem 3.2). Using the
naive model N is cheaper and preferable, yet it is impossible to use only this naive
model to enforce cooperation since the provider may strategically manipulate its rat-
ings by colluding with the raters. Theorem 4.1 proposes a way to optimize the cost
of using the expensive computational model R1, while still ensuring cooperation by
rational providers (the proof is in the electronic appendix).
THEOREM 4.1. Consider the selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉, in which the dishonesty
detector R is implemented by using the trust model R1 with probability c and the
naive model N with probability 1 − c. Suppose that ε is small and the incentive for
badmouthing is negligible, e.g., providers sell different services with little competition.
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. 6, No. 4, Article 24, Publication date: October 2011.
Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments 24:13
Fig. 4. The minimal necessary probability c∗ to use the expensive algorithm R1 depending on the number
of remaining transactions δ of a rational provider for ε = 0.01, u∗ = v∗.
The provider finds it optimal to cooperate in all but its last  transactions, where
 = max{1,  v∗u∗(1−2ε) }, if c ≥ c∗ = v
∗
δu∗(1−2ε) , where δ ≥  is the number of remaining
transactions of the rational provider. This result holds in the presence of strategic
manipulations of ratings.
Figure 4 shows the probability c∗ that a client must use the expensive trust model
R1 given the estimated remaining transactions δ of the provider, for u∗ = v∗, ε = 0.01. If
most providers stay in the system infinitely or long enough, the mixture of two compu-
tational trust models helps reduce the total implementation cost significantly. Hence,
given the rationality of participants, the accurate computational trust algorithm R1
mostly plays the role of a sanctioning tool rather than a tool for learning the trustwor-
thiness of the participants.
5. USING REPUTATION INFORMATION IN DYNAMIC SCENARIOS
The preceding analysis shows that if rational peers stay in the system infinitely, co-
operation is ensured relatively easily. Based on this result, we present an implemen-
tation of the peer selection protocol such that the rational providers are motivated
to cooperate in most of their transactions, given that peers may arrive and leave at
different times. Note that we still restrict the problem to the case where the cost of
establishing identity is high, and each peer is motivated to use one identity for all
transactions.
We approximate the algorithm for a rational (strategic) client to select a provider
before each transaction as in Algorithm 5. The algorithm is built on the observation
that the distribution of the number of lifetime transactions of providers can be learned
from the system history and available as common knowledge. Rational peers use this
information to adapt their behavior strategically to maximize their long-term benefits.
Algorithm 5 follows the peer selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 in Definition 2.4, where
the involved quantities are computed trivially. For example, in an e-trading system,
the minimal legitimate gain u∗ of a provider (a seller) is the minimal value of an arti-
cle accepted for trading in the system. The gain v is the value of the current item plus
the shipping cost announced by the seller. min is the minimal number of remaining
transactions that a rational provider finds incentives to cooperate for the worst level
of α, β (claim (1) of Theorem 3.2). As the distribution of the number of transactions
by providers can be learned from trading history of all providers, it is possible for the
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. 6, No. 4, Article 24, Publication date: October 2011.
24:14 L.-H. Vu and K. Aberer
Algorithm 1 selectProvider(gains u, v, providers S, alg R, threshold k)
1: Eligibles = ∅;
2: Retrieve the global blacklist L;
3: for each s ∈ S\ L do
4: Get worst case values ε of errors α, β of algorithmR;
5: Estimate benefit u∗ and current cheating gain v of s;
6: Compute min as in Eq (1) with v;
7: p[s] = Pr[provider s stays at least min further transactions];
8: Get binary rating ri by peer i on the latest transaction of s;
9: Run R to evaluate the reliability (binary trust) ti of ri.
10: if ri == ti then
11: Eligibles = Eligibles ∪ {s, p[s]};
12: else
13: Post the cheating detection ri = ti on the shared space;
14: Put s in the blacklist L if there are at least k such negative results;
15: end if
16: end for
17: Select the provider s from Eligibles with probability p(s)/
∑
s p(s);
Algorithm 2 bestServiceStrategy(alg R, threshold k): servingStrategy
1: Get worst case values ε of errors α, β of algorithm R;
2: Estimate the minimal own benefit u∗ and illegitime gain v in the current transaction;
3: Compute ∗ as in Eq (1) with v;
4: Estimate its own remaining number of transactions δ;
5: if δ ≥ ∗ then
6: Return cooperative;
7: else
8: Return cheating;
9: end if
client to estimate the probability p[s] that a provider stays in min further transac-
tions. This estimation is personalized to each client and dependent on his own belief
in the continuation of the game of the provider with future clients. The probability p[s]
can be seen approximately as the probability that this strategic provider cooperates in
the current transaction and thus is used as a selection criteria (line 17). It is notewor-
thy that even if p[s] is known to the provider, the recursive end-game situation still
does not occur. As long as the provider uses a single identity for selling services, the
strategy of Theorem 3.2 is still the best for them.
According to Theorem 3.2, the best strategies of rational providers are implemented
as in Algorithm 2. That is, a strategic provider will cooperate in all transactions except
its last ∗ ones. Similar to its clients, the provider estimates its ∗ parameter based
on the global knowledge of the misclassification errors α, β of the learning algorithm
being used, its current temporal gain v, and the minimal legitimate gain u∗ at each
step.
Given Algorithms 5 and 2, the number of good transactions depends on how accu-
rately the clients can estimate the number of remaining transactions of a provider in
order to select the right one still having incentives to cooperate. More concretely, a
strategic provider is motivated to cooperate if δ ≥ ∗.
The algorithm for a strategic client to use a mix of two trust models R and N to
select a provider (Theorem 4.1) is implemented as follows. A client estimates the
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. 6, No. 4, Article 24, Publication date: October 2011.
Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments 24:15
Fig. 5. Architecture of the trust prototyping and simulation framework.
number of remaining transactions δclient of a provider from the expected number of
transactions of all providers in the system. Next, it computes the minimal probability
cclient = vδclientu∗(1−2ε) it needs to use R in the current transaction. On the other hand,
a strategic provider also estimates the values cclient, δclient, and computes the minimal
probability cprovider = vδu∗(1−2ε) for its actual remaining number of transactions δ. The
provider cooperates only if it stays more than δ > ∗ and cclient ≥ cprovider.
Since it is difficult to analytically measure the system’s cooperation level with vari-
ous join and leave processes of peers, this measurement will be done later via a simu-
lation whose input parameters are obtained from real case studies (Section 6).
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1. Simulation Framework
We have developed a generic trust-prototyping and simulation framework and used it
for the experiments in this work. This tool enables the rapid development and testing
of many computational trust models under a variety of settings. Particularly, new
algorithms for peers and system performance metrics can be defined and integrated
into the framework without major effort.
Figure 5 shows the overall architecture of the framework, which is composed of the
following modular components. The PeerApplication layer is an abstraction of the P2P
application to be simulated, which is defined as an interaction scenario where peers
provide or consume resources of different prices and quality. This abstraction makes
it possible to tweak our system to simulate a range of similar applications, e.g., a
customer-to-customer trading scenario, or a market of services. The TrustManagement
layer serves as a trust management subsystem to help a peer to model and learn
the trustworthiness of another. APIs and basic building blocks are given for users to
develop and plug in many computational trust learning models and decision-making
algorithms into the system. The ServiceSupport layer encapsulates the distributed in-
formation storage, retrieval, and routing mechanisms being used. This layer provides
the upper layers with capabilities of sending requests and receiving responses among
the peers, as well as enabling the retrieval of information on the services and their
ratings for the trust computations. As a result, this layer facilitates the integration
and testing of a given trust management approach on top of different distributed
information management mechanisms. The SimulatedNetwork layer represents the
underlying communication network, which can be implemented as a centralized or
decentralized system depending on the simulated system. As we only emphasized
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Fig. 6. Screenshots of the trust-prototyping and simulation framework in the interactive mode. Users can
configure several simulation parameters (the right panel) such as the percentages of different peer types
and the computational trust models to be used. The trust relationships among peers are shown in the top-
left panel, where honest participants have many trust relationships. During simulation, the behavior of
peers can also be inspected and changed interactively or programmatically. The system performance over
time is shown in the bottom-left panel. Most simulation settings such as the distribution of peer types with
various behaviors and the definitions of new system performance metrics can be done programmatically via
the provided APIs.
the study of the social and strategic behavior of peers in the application layer, we
only provided a basic implementation of this layer. The layer was implemented as
a network of nodes with the latencies among them following the King latency data
set [Gummadi et al. 2002]. In fact, our system can be configured to use other message-
passing protocols or underlying communication networks with any latency models, as
needed. The SimulationManager takes care of all back-end supports for the simulation,
e.g., the measurement, inspection, and collection of system performance data in both
interactive and batch modes. We used RePastJ [North et al. 2006] as the base to
develop this component, as this library provides several useful tools for setting up
the environment, dynamically controlling simulation parameters, result visualization
and analysis, and so on. Again, the modular design and well-specified APIs of the
SimulationManager layer makes it possible to use the system with other simulation
libraries. In fact, it is possible to develop a decentralized implementation of this layer
to support larger-scale simulations or even to emulate an application scenario on a
real network, given participation of real users. Figure 6 shows some screenshots of
our prototyping and simulation framework in action. Further details can be found
online.3
3http://lsirpeople.epfl.ch/lhvu/download/repsim/
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6.2. Simulation Goals and Settings
Since it is nontrivial to implement full rationality, rational peers were approximated
as strategic: they used all available information to make the best decisions to maxi-
mize their expected lifetime utilities. We measured the cooperation level in the system
given that the rational participants had knowledge of the theoretical results proved
in the previous analysis. Specifically, the goal of our experiments was to investigate,
(1) whether reasonably accurate computational trust models helped to enforce cooper-
ation in such approximately rational environments even with observation noise, and
(2) whether expensive trust models could be used less frequently to save cost without
considerably affecting cooperation.
We used the trust simulation framework to implement an example P2P trading
application. Peers were modeled as sellers or buyers of many articles at a similar price
and exhibited different behaviors. The cooperation level and accumulated utilities of
different types of peers were then measured and analyzed under various simulation
settings. First, peers could leave and join dynamically, thus having different numbers
of transactions during their lifetime. Second, buyers used different computational
trust models with personalized inputs to evaluate the trustworthiness of the others.
Third, peers exhibited several behaviors, both irrationally malicious and/or strategic—
details to be presented in coming sections. The dynamic joins and leaves of peers in
the system were simulated according to statistics from real-life case studies on many
live peer-to-peer systems [Stutzbach and Rejaie 2006]. We set the interarrival time
of peers to follow a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.53, and the up-time
of peers to follow a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.34 [Stutzbach and
Rejaie 2006]. Since we did not have statistics on the number of transactions a peer
performs in a real peer-to-peer trading scenario, such a distribution was approximated
as follows. We computed the number of transactions a seller participated in from its
up-time by using a scaling factor K. K was set such that those peers with up-time
approximating the mean of the overall uptime distribution would participate in μtrans
transactions, where μtrans was a parameter of the simulation. The rationale behind
this choice was that the number of transactions a peer was involved in was assumed
to be proportional to its participating time in the system. Experiments with other
distributions of the number of peer transactions are subject to future work.
6.3. Implementation of Peer Behaviors
A buyer first searched for the available articles and then selected one according to
Algorithm 5 and its variant, as introduced in Section 5. A good seller shipped the
article after receiving the payment with a high probability (γ + = 0.99 ) of satisfying
the buyer and getting a good rating. A bad seller either did not ship the article or only
shipped a low quality item to the buyer, resulting in a very low probability (γ − ≈ 0.05)
of meeting buyer’s anticipation and thus was likely to receive a bad rating afterwards.
Other sellers were strategic and used available information to find the best strategy
to follow, e.g., whether it should ship the item or not, so as to maximize its long-term
utility, following the strategy described in Algorithm 2 (Section 5). Note that it is
also possible to configure the simulation such that the observation noise γ +, γ − varies
depending on other factors, e.g., subject to the buyer’s viewpoint given the price of an
item. However, this extension is out of the scope of the article and subject to future
work.
Regarding rating behaviors, a peer exhibited one of the following behaviors: honest
(always reported correctly about what it had observed), badmouthing (always reported
negatively), advertising (always reported positively), ignoring (did not report), and
strategic. Strategic raters might provide correct, incorrect ratings, or not leave any
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Table II. Experimental Settings of the Representative Simulation Scenarios
Sellers consisted of: s% strategic, g% good, and b% bad, and raters are of: h% honest, sr% strategic, a% advertising, b%
badmouthing, and the rest leaving no ratings after a transaction. We set a > b since in most case studies of current
reputation systems, the majority of the feedback is positive, thus it is likely that advertising behaviors are more popular.
By default k = 1 if unspecified otherwise.
Scenario s g b h sr a b Result
C1. No strategic sellers, most sellers bad 0 15 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 7
C2. No strategic sellers, half sellers good 0 50 50 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 7
C3. No strategic sellers, most sellers good 0 85 15 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 7
C4. Few sellers strategic, most bad 10 5 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 8
Ck4 . Similar to C4 with the threshold k = 1, 2, 5 10 5 85 0 to 100
100−h
5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 9
C5. Most sellers strategic 85 5 10 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 8
C6. Approximately equal seller types 33 34 33 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 8
Ck6 . Same as C5, with the threshold k = 1, 2, 5 33 34 33 0 to 100
100−h
5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Figure 9
C7. All sellers strategic 100 0 0 0 to 100 99−h3
(99−h)
3 1 Figure 10
rating, depending on the situation. To reduce the complexity of the simulation, in this
work the rating behavior of strategic peers was limited to the following safe strategy.
When A was asked by B how A estimated the trustworthiness of another peer X , the
reporting strategy of A was determined based on the relationships A − B and A − X as
follows. If the querying peer B was unknown to A, and the target peer X was a trusted
peer, a blacklisted, or an unknown peer to A, A would respectively report positively,
negatively, or honestly. If B was trusted by A, A always reported honestly. Requests
from blacklisted peers were ignored by A. This reporting strategy was chosen for two
reasons. First, the cost of reporting after a transaction in our current application was
negligible. Second, this strategy helped peers to rapidly build up and extend its trust
relationships with many other peers in the system, thus intuitively most beneficial to
them.
Experimental settings and corresponding results are summarized in Table II. The
trading system was simulated with dynamical leaves and joins of peers, starting with
n = 256 peers. In the stationary regime, the number of peers approximately doubled
this initial number. The simulator was able to run with up to 1024 initial peers, and
the results were similar. Each simulation was run until the stationary regime and the
measures of each metric were their medians over at least 35 different runs (to avoid
outliers).
6.4. Accuracy of Example Computational Trust Models
Three computational trust models were used in the simulation to evaluate the relia-
bility of the most recent rating on a seller. The first computational trust model L was
the PeerTrust PSM/DTC algorithm proposed by Xiong and Liu [2004]. A peer i esti-
mated the trustworthiness of another rater j based on the similarity between i’s and
j’s ratings on some other sellers that both i and j had contacted. The second model
X used the maximum likelihood estimation-based learning algorithm [Despotovic and
Aberer 2004; Vu and Aberer 2007] with a probabilistic decision rule. With this model, a
peer i estimated the probability a rater j was trustworthy to maximize the likelihood of
getting the current ratings from i and j on those sellers with whom both i, j had experi-
ence. We also implemented a dishonesty detector A with a very good misclassification
error bound ε = 0.01, and with a high cost of each time being used. In practice, a peer
implements such an accurate detector by asking for information from the third party
monitoring or consulting agents before becoming involved in important transactions.
The dishonesty detector A was similar to a global computational trust model and used
to verify the relation between the learning accuracy and the cooperation level in the
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Fig. 7. Accuracy of the trust model L in three scenarios C1, C2, C3 of Table II, where μtrans = 50.
system, where peers used the same algorithm to evaluate the reliability of raters. The
two algorithms L and X were used to test the efficiency of the peer-selection protocol in
a more relaxed environment, where peers used different localized algorithms with per-
sonalized inputs and settings to estimate rating behaviors. For the sake of readability,
in the following experiments only the results for the computational trust model L are
shown, unless specified otherwise. The results for the model X were similar to those
of L, and the results of A were even better. The use of other global trust models like a
complaint-based algorithm [Aberer and Despotovic 2001] or EigenTrust [Kamvar et al.
2003] instead of algorithm A is subject to future work.
As a base for other experiments, first the overall misclassification errors α, β of the
computational trust models L and X were estimated for a variety of scenarios with
different fractions of the honestly reporting users h in the system. The most represen-
tative scenarios C1, C2, and C3 for this experimentation are given in Table II. These
scenarios were designed based on the observation that it was unnecessary to measure
precisely the accuracy of a learning algorithm, but only the overall trend and worst
case misclassification errors α, β depending on the percentage of honest reporting peers
h in the system. Furthermore, strategic selling behaviors could be excluded when esti-
mating these misclassification errors since the learning used only historical data, and
the outcome of strategic selling behaviors could be assumed to follow one of the overall
trends of the three extreme cases C1, C2, and C3. These statistics were measured for
three cases with different fractions of good and bad sellers in the systems (scenarios
C1, C2, and C3 in Table II). Note that the accuracy of these algorithms has already
been extensively studied in related work [Despotovic and Aberer 2004; Xiong and Liu
2004], most of which having been shown to have low α, β under various attack scenar-
ios. In this article, the only difference was that such computational trust models are
used to evaluate the reliability of the last rating on a seller, instead of estimating the
trustworthiness of the seller. This reliability was determined based on the reputation
information of the user giving that very rating. Hence, the goal of the simulation here
was to verify that misclassification errors of these trust models, when used in this new
context, were still sufficiently low, so that the theoretical analysis of the relation be-
tween the error bound and cooperation, would be applicable. That said, we needed to
verify if an approximate bound ε of the misclassification error rates α, β of the com-
putational trust model being used satisfies the requirements to use Theorem 3.2, i.e.,
ε < εmax for a chosen threshold k. The obtained error bound ε would then be used as
common knowledge in later experiments with various combinations of strategic, bad,
and good sellers.
Figure 7 shows the estimated maximal values of α, β of the learning algorithm L
based on the PeerTrust PSM/DTC approach [Xiong and Liu 2004], where μtrans = 50,
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Fig. 8. Relation between the fraction of good transactions and the accuracy of the computational trust model
L in the presence of honest, malicious, and strategic peers. In the cases of most strategic sellers (C5) and
with equal seller types (C6), cooperation is very high thanks to the low misclassification errors. Cooperation
is much lower with a lower reliability in the evaluation of the raters’ behaviors (case C4).
and in three extreme cases C1, C2, C3 of Table II. Generally, the false positive error
rate α of L was much lower where most peers staying in the system longer (μtrans = 50)
and in less malicious environments (higher levels of honest reporters and good sell-
ers), as we expected. With a higher number of honest raters in the system, the false
negatives however could not be improved as significantly as the false positives. This
might be due to our nonoptimized implementation of the PeerTrust approach to es-
timate a rating’s reliability, e.g., it did not learn from the previous false negatives
in a noisy environment where the good sellers might occasionally provide bad ser-
vices. It is expected that in practice optimized implementations of such a model would
be much more resilient and yield significantly lower false positive and false negative
rates. Nevertheless, even in the worst case of the simulation, max{α, β} was well bel-
low 0.4, and thus there existed a threshold k for which Theorem 3.2 was applicable
(Figure 1 requires k ≥ 2 in this case). Since it is more interesting to consider the
more representative cases with all different types of sellers, we mainly focused on the
average cases C2 and C3, where it may be approximated that max{α, β} < ε = 0.25.
This error bound ε well satisfied the maximal error bound εmax required by Theo-
rem 3.2, with any threshold k ≥ 1 (c.f. Figure 1). These max{α, β} statistics were
then used in our later experiments as the global knowledge ε of all peers. We also
observed the same trend of these accuracy statistics in the presence of strategic peers
in later experiments. Different values of μtrans were also tested. We observed that
when most sellers participated in a few transactions (μtrans < 10), the computational
trust model did not have sufficient data for its learning, resulting in high α, β > 0.5,
and our peer selection approach using the last rating was ineffective in enforcing
cooperation.
6.5. Cooperation in Various Environments
The levels of cooperation in the system with different types of sellers and raters are
given in Figure 8 for μtrans = 50 (cases C4, C5, C6 of Table II). The case of all strategic
sellers showed even a better trend. Experiments were also performed in other extreme
cases, e.g., all sellers, buyers, and raters were strategic and gave similar results. For
small μtrans < 10 the cooperation dropped significantly, as the evaluation of rating
was not reliable. Given many types of rating and service behaviors (as in the cases
C5, C6 of Table II), the accumulated utilities of strategic peers who followed the serving
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Fig. 9. Cooperation in the system with different ε and k (the cases Ck4, Ck6 of Table II).
strategies designed by our theoretical analysis were also measured (not shown). The
utilities of the strategic sellers were close to those of the good ones and significantly
higher than the bad sellers. The reason was that strategic peers were enforced to
cooperate in most of their transactions. In fact, fully cooperative sellers had slightly
better utilities. This was due to our pessimistic implementation of strategic peers, who
did not cooperate during their last  transactions. What happened was that in the
last  transaction, several strategic peers who ever cheated were also blacklisted.
Therefore, under the proposed peer selection mechanism it would be better off for a
strategic seller to cooperate even in its last transaction. The proposed approach still
worked even with dynamic joins and leaves of peers in the system, given that most
sellers stayed in the system long enough (μtrans > 10 in our simulation).
The impact of threshold k is shown in Figure 9 for the cases Ck4, C
k
6. Note that
the measurement in Figure 9(b) was the accumulated number of good transactions
per peer, which increased over time and whose absolute values were less important.
We sampled it at the time where the simulation reached the stationary regime only
to compare the difference between the number of good transactions completed under
different peer-selection schemes with various k. We made the following observations.
First, for a given ε, a lower k led to a higher fraction of cooperation in the system
(Figure 9 a), yet with a lower accumulative number of good transactions (Figure 9b).
The reason was that with lower k and higher ε, the buyers wrongly blacklisted some
good sellers and thus the total number of good transactions was smaller (though the
percentage of good transactions was still high). Second, for a small ε = 0.25, the
threshold k could be increased to increase the transaction rate while not reducing the
percentage of good transactions, e.g., the case Ck6, 
 = 0.25, k = 1, 2, 5.
In the case of all strategic peers C7, we also used a combination of two computa-
tional trust models to measure the save in the total communication cost (Theorem 4.1).
Figure 10 shows the cost of two approaches. The first used only the hypothetically
accurate yet expensive trust model A, while the second used A with only a low prob-
ability. Therein, the cost of a computational trust model was measured as the average
number of sent and received messages for a good transaction. It is interesting to see
that the communication cost could be reduced significantly by using the expensive
model with a very low frequency while still maintaining a high level of cooperation
in the system. Furthermore, the approach combining two trust models learned faster,
and during the same simulation time, the total number of good transactions in the
system (not shown in Figure 10) was also much higher.
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Fig. 10. A comparison of the communication cost between two approaches: the use of a single accurate,
expensive algorithm A, and the mix of A and the naive algorithm N .
7. RELATED WORK
Several existing works focus on the development of various computational models to
learn peers’ trustworthy behavior based on their historical performance [Despotovic
and Aberer 2006; Golbeck 2006; Jøsang et al. 2007]. These are complementary to our
work, since any robust and accurate computational trust models can be used in our
reputation-based peer selection protocol seamlessly.
Our work is inspired by the analysis of Dellarocas [2005a], which studies various
design parameters of reputation mechanisms. Some conclusions in Dellarocas [2005a]
coincide with the analysis in this article, e.g., the robustness of the naive trust model
algorithm. However, our work considers many aspects of a reputation-based compu-
tational trust model, namely its accuracy and cost, as well as the possibility of using
such a model to effectively enforce cooperation among providers in heterogenous envi-
ronments with rational and malicious participants.
Our cost-efficient reputation management approach in Section 4 is an application
of inspection game theory [Avenhaus et al. 2002], where an accurate and expensive
computational trust model plays the role of an inspector detecting the dishonest be-
havior of a provider (an inspectee). The provided result confirms the important role
of an effective identity management scheme, as earlier identified by Friedman and
Resnick [2001]. The work most related to our approach is Agrawal and Terzi [2006],
yet it addresses another problem of how to control the behaviors of agents in a central-
ized sovereign information-sharing scenario. Our work studies the possibility of using
computational trust mechanisms in a cost-effective way and provides general results
applicable to a wider range of applications with different degrees of centralization.
8. CONCLUSION
We have presented a theoretical analysis and extensive simulation to study the possi-
bility of using a reputation-based computational trust model to enforce cooperation in
a heterogenous environment where rational and malicious behaviors are present. We
have analyzed a peer selection protocol in which a client uses a trust model to evaluate
the reliability of the most recent rating on a provider, so as to select the most eligi-
ble one for its next transaction. Such a simple selection protocol effectively filters out
irrationally malicious providers and creates a social control mechanism to stimulate
cooperation of rational providers in most of their transactions. To a larger extent, the
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presented protocol establishes an umbrella framework to use reputation information
effectively by exploiting both its sanctioning and signaling roles [Dellarocas 2005a] in
decentralized and self-organized systems.
The theoretical result of this article proves that the key to ensuring cooperation is
not the accuracy/errors of the trust learning algorithm being used, but the effective-
ness of identity management. Establishing a new identity must be costly so that the
rational peers want to stay in the system for many transactions rather than changing
their identities and starting over. Such whitewashing behaviors can be prevented by
using available techniques, for example, to impose a direct entrant fee on newly joined
peers, or to give an identity premium to each participant such that keeping the same
identity is its best strategy [Vu and Aberer 2010].
Many interesting implications can also be derived from our work. First, any existing
computational trust model with reasonable misclassification errors in identifying
dishonest ratings can be used effectively to enforce cooperation in a heterogeneous
environment with malicious and rational behaviors. Second, our analysis implies that
when peers use different algorithms with a certain acceptable accuracy to learn the
trustworthiness of their potential partners, cooperation still emerges. Third, depend-
ing on the presence of rationality from participants of the scenario being studied,
either simple or sophisticated trust learning algorithms may be appropriate. In envi-
ronments with long-term and fully rational peers wanting to maximize their utilities,
any trust model with a bounded error is sufficient to stimulate cooperation. In the
scenarios where malicious peers want to attack the system at any cost, sophisticated
algorithms are necessary to filter out malicious participants.
As future work, it is of our interest to derive some theoretical bounds on the co-
operation level in the system, using the proposed reputation management approach,
given the arrival and up-time distributions of peers. An implementation of various
serving strategies of bounded rational peers in the simulation framework may be also
necessary. Such empirical simulations may give us more insights into the effective-
ness of different trust learning algorithms in enforcing cooperation in the presence of
bounded-rational peers with limited reasoning capability. At the end of the day, this
combination of an analytical and a simulation-based approach would help us to provide
a “cookbook” for the design and application of targeted, cost-effective, and realistic de-
centralized trust management approaches, such as needed for peer-to-peer, electronic
commerce, or community systems.
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX
Due to space limitations, all proofs are in an electronic appendix that can be accessed
in the ACM Digital Library.
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